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Privatization has become a popular strategy to promote economic development in 
emerging, developing, and developed economies. Despite its popularity, little atten- 
tion has been devoted to examination of the organizational and managerial implica- 
tions of privatization or to the effect of privatization on companies' ability to innovate 
and engage in entrepreneurial activities. In this article we discuss privatization's 
increasing importance and present a model that links privatization to a firm's entre- 
preneurial activities. We conclude with a discussion of issues that we believe deserve 
scholars' attention in theory development and subsequent empirical examination. 
The global economic landscape is undergoing 
unprecedented change that is multifaceted and 
wide ranging in nature (Hitt, Harrison, & Ireland, 
in press b; Ireland & Hitt, 1999) and that is 
clearly evident in the adoption of privatization 
as a strategy on a worldwide basis. The primary 
purpose of this strategic option is to promote 
economic development in emerging, develop- 
ing, and developed economies. Emerging econ- 
omies and their markets, however, are charac- 
terized by economic, social, or political 
instability (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 
in press a). There are also substantial differ- 
ences in the institutional infrastructure between 
emerging and developed economies (Newman, 
this issue). Given that the idiosyncratic charac- 
teristics of an economy's structure can pro- 
foundly affect the rules of exchange in its mar- 
kets (North, 1990), these differences can have a 
major effect on the outcomes that countries or 
companies can achieve through privatization. 
Following decades of experimentation with 
various systems of state ownership and control, 
many nations have adopted privatization strate- 
gies as a centerpiece of their national policies- 
policies that aim to promote and support social 
progress and economic development or to initiate 
economic renewal. Over $700 billion in assets 
have been privatized in the world's economies in 
the last decade alone, approximately 40 percent of 
which has occurred in emerging economies (Ra- 
mamurti, this issue). Brazil is expected to privatize 
as much as $80 billion in assets before its ongoing 
conversion of public assets to private ownership is 
completed (Doh, this issue). Countries using pri- 
vatization strategies as a primary policy tool to 
induce and promote economic growth represent 
most of the world's regions, including Africa, Asia, 
Latin America, and Europe. 
By placing the means of production outside of 
state ownership and control, privatization un- 
leashes the forces and discipline of the free mar- 
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ket. The resulting pattern of action (i.e., privat- 
ization) and reaction (i.e., the forces of a free 
market economy) strongly influence the degree 
to which governments control their national 
economies (D'Souza & Megginson, 1999; Mel- 
loan, 2000). Privatization, therefore, has the po- 
tential to transform national economies, indus- 
tries, and organizations by infusing a spirit of 
entrepreneurial risk taking. These changes are 
in process currently across the world's six major 
continents, making privatization an integral part 
of emerging, developing, and developed coun- 
tries' twenty-first-century strategic agendas. Effec- 
tive privatizations, however, where state-owned 
industries are privatized without creating signifi- 
cant unemployment and related disruptions, are 
difficult to achieve (Melloan, 2000). Consequently, 
some of the contributors in this special topic forum 
challenge us to proceed cautiously when forming 
expectations about privatization's outcomes. 
When examining privatization as a change 
strategy, researchers are concerned with privat- 
ization's effects on the creation of wealth. To 
date, most privatization researchers have fo- 
cused on the country as the unit of analysis, 
primarily examining the macroenvironmental 
conditions that lead to privatization (e.g., Fila- 
totchev, Hoskisson, Buck, & Wright, 1996; Galal, 
Jones, Tandon, & Vogelsang, 1994; Grosse & 
Yanes, 1998). Researchers also have examined 
the factors that lead to the use of particular 
approaches to privatization (e.g., Miller, 1995; 
Minniti & Polutnik, 1999; Ramamurti, 1992). Most 
of this research has been grounded in economic 
or financial theories, leaving important organi- 
zational issues unexplored. 
Further, in prior research scholars have not ex- 
amined the major organizational transformations 
that occur following privatization. These transfor- 
mations can be far reaching, possibly leading to 
the formation of new stakeholder groups and re- 
defining the patterns of these stakeholders' inter- 
actions with the firm. The effects of these groups' 
interaction patterns on a firm may be significant, 
creating a need for extensive organizational and 
behavioral adjustments. 
THE PURPOSE OF THE SPECIAL TOPIC 
FORUM 
With this Academy of Management Review 
special topic forum, the authors seek to contrib- 
ute to our understanding of the potential effects 
of privatization on organizational transforma- 
tion. Organizational transformation includes 
changes in organizational values, cultures, sys- 
tems, and strategies. Transformation centers on 
how a firm is organized, governed, and man- 
aged as it adjusts to the competitive realities of 
a market economy. Changes in cognitive, stra- 
tegic, cultural, and structural dimensions that 
are required to support organizational transfor- 
mation may induce or expand entrepreneurial 
actions, calculated risk taking, and innovation. 
Entrepreneurial activities are important for 
achieving efficiency, improving productivity, 
and creating wealth (Baumol, 1996). These activ- 
ities foster innovation that leads to the introduc- 
tion of a new product, process, technology, sys- 
tem, technique, resource, or capability to the 
firm or its markets (Covin & Miles, 1999). Innova- 
tion is the foundation for competitive advantage 
in the new global economy (Hitt, Nixon, Hoskis- 
son, & Kochhar, 1999). An entrepreneurial trans- 
formation, in which the firm engages in more 
entrepreneurial activities, risk taking, and inno- 
vation, is key to an organization's transition 
from what is often a state-owned status to one of 
competing in a market-based economy. 
Even though one reason to privatize firms is to 
promote entrepreneurial transformation, achiev- 
ing such a transformation is more difficult in an 
emerging economy than in a developed econ- 
omy. Typically, the sparse resources and capa- 
bilities previously state-owned enterprises pos- 
sess are inadequate to support an entrepreneurial 
transformation. As a result, newly privatized firms 
in emerging economies often find it necessary to 
seek financial, technological, and managerial re- 
sources and capabilities from more richly en- 
dowed firms (Hitt et al., in press a). 
To compete successfully in a market-based 
economy, privatized firms also must quickly 
learn how to use newly acquired resources 
(Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, in press). Rapidly acquir- 
ing application-oriented and learning-based 
skills is oftentimes facilitated by the develop- 
ment of cooperative arrangements, such as joint 
ventures and equity strategic alliances (Hitt, Ire- 
land, & Hoskisson, in press c). Some of these 
alliances are formed with companies that are 
outside the privatized firm's domestic market. 
Although such international joint ventures are a 
challenging organizational form, the rate of 
their formation continues to increase (Yan, 1998). 
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Regardless of the mode used to acquire and 
apply new skills, firms find how to use modern 
technologies and the related skills required to 
engage in successful commercial activities dif- 
ficult without adequate levels of absorptive ca- 
pacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). This capacity 
allows privatized firms to assimilate and exploit 
new knowledge. Assimilation and exploitation 
of new knowledge can ignite innovation in pri- 
vatized firms. Developing absorptive capacity 
can be difficult, given that firms from developed 
markets have learned how to buffer their core 
technologies from appropriation by other firms, 
even those with whom they form strategic alli- 
ances. Written contracts are a formal means of 
preventing appropriation, whereas interactions 
based on trust that have evolved over time are 
an informal yet equally effective means of pro- 
tecting a firm's intellectual property. 
Recent research results highlight the impor- 
tance of these capabilities. Uhlenbruck and De- 
Castro (in press) found that acquisitions of 
newly privatized firms from emerging markets 
by companies from developed countries en- 
hanced the acquired firm's performance. Trans- 
ferring new technologies, managerial skills, 
and financial resources from the acquiring to 
the acquired firm led to higher performance. The 
transfer of skills facilitates the acquired and 
recently privatized firms' efforts to transform 
into viable competitors in a market-based econ- 
omy (Hitt et al., in press b). 
Focusing on the organizational transforma- 
tion that may follow privatization and privatiza- 
tion's potential effects on entrepreneurial activ- 
ities, this special topic forum is designed to 
improve our understanding of several phenom- 
ena, including (1) the factors that serve as a 
catalyst for privatization in countries at different 
stages of their economic development; (2) differ- 
ent privatization strategies and their unique 
characteristics; (3) the effect of privatization on 
the process of organizational transformation, 
particularly in promoting firm-level entrepre- 
neurship; and (4) the implications of organiza- 
tional transformation for the effective manage- 
ment of privatized firms. Our goal, indeed our 
hope, is to highlight the importance of privatiza- 
tion in creating a new set of organizational dy- 
namics that promote innovation, risk taking, 
proactive management, and entrepreneurship. 
This emphasis is based on the fact that coun- 
tries, industries, and organizations that foster 
entrepreneurship are well positioned to achieve 
technological and economic progress. 
In the next section we examine the domain 
and importance of privatization. A model that 
links the antecedents and the process of privat- 
ization to entrepreneurial transformation fol- 
lows this discussion. Thereafter, we review the 
key themes in the articles appearing in the spe- 
cial topic forum, highlighting their contribu- 
tions. We also describe major areas for future 
research and challenges scholars face as they 
seek to build theories that are capable of effec- 
tively capturing the relationships between pri- 
vatization and entrepreneurial transformation. 
PRIVATIZATION: DOMAIN AND IMPORTANCE 
To capture a complex phenomenon, in most 
definitions of privatization authors highlight the 
change in a firm's ownership and, as a conse- 
quence, the change in its governance and con- 
trol systems (e.g., Ramamurti, 1992). Changes in 
firms' ownership occur in several ways (Ra- 
mamurti, this issue; Ramirez, 1998). These 
changes, however, typically produce a transfer 
of ownership of fully or partially owned public 
or state-owned enterprises to private parties. 
This transfer determines the appropriation of 
residual rents (profits) and the allocation of re- 
sidual decision rights (ownership rights). 
Ramamurti (this issue) notes that privatization 
can be defined in both a narrow and a broad 
sense. The different definitions indicate that as 
a process, privatization has many shapes (Doh, 
this issue). Viewed broadly, privatization is any 
action that increases the role of the private sec- 
tor in the economy. In this broad sense, activi- 
ties that would constitute privatization might 
include the sale of public assets, deregulation, 
opening state monopolies to greater competi- 
tion, contracting out, the private provision of 
public services, joint capital projects using pub- 
lic and private finance, reduced subsidies, and 
increasing or introducing user charges (Jackson 
& Price, 1994). 
From a narrow lens, privatization is any ac- 
tion that transfers some or all of the ownership 
and/or control of state-owned enterprises to the 
private sector. As Ramamurti (this issue) ob- 
serves, privatization of one type does not neces- 
sarily imply privatization of the other type. For 
example, a nation might privatize some of its 
state-owned enterprises without deregulating 
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the industry or the base economy in which those 
enterprises compete. 
Another form of the narrow definition of pri- 
vatization is the transfer of ownership and deci- 
sion-making authority from federal, state, or mu- 
nicipal governments to the hands of private 
investors (DeCastro & Uhlenbruck, 1997; Ogden 
& Watson, 1999; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). The 
potential effects of narrow and broad types of 
privatization provide an important research 
question. Although not the focus of the special 
topic forum, we revisit this issue in our discus- 
sion of future research directions. 
The appropriation of residual rents (profits) 
can occur through private or public mecha- 
nisms. When it occurs through private mecha- 
nisms, profits go to private owners as rewards 
for risk taking, entrepreneurial activities, and 
efficient and innovative management (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). These profits also can be used 
in ways that benefit the public welfare, such as 
expanding companies' operations to create jobs 
and reduce unemployment (Hart, 1995). These 
actions should benefit the firm, its shareholders, 
and the general public welfare. 
Allocation of ownership rights is another key 
dimension in understanding privatization. Own- 
ership rights refer to the locus of authority for 
making strategic choices (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). These rights usually occur on a contin- 
uum, ranging from wholly public to totally pri- 
vate. Owners generally have the authority to 
decide the firm's strategic goals, develop its 
competitive strategy, and allocate its resources. 
Certainly, this is the case when private parties 
hold ownership. 
When public managers, representing state 
owners or a specific constituency, control own- 
ership and, hence, decision rights, the mandate 
embodied in their organizations' founding char- 
ters will be discharged. Public managers, there- 
fore, often must address a set of complex- 
indeed, competing-goals that include creating 
employment opportunities, managing national 
resources, and ensuring social justice. Achiev- 
ing these diverse goals frequently entails satis- 
ficing multiple political claims, which may re- 
sult in significant deviations from market-based 
efficiency. Thus, considered from a micro level, 
these managers often operate from an institu- 
tionalized public sector template when encoun- 
tering privatization. Johnson, Smith, and Cod- 
ling (this issue) propose that at the onset of 
privatization, this template may be deeply em- 
bedded, taken for granted, and oftentimes mind- 
lessly enacted. To facilitate the privatization 
process, a firm is challenged to take actions 
through which a private sector template can be 
institutionalized within its managerial ranks. 
Therefore, Johnson and colleagues view privat- 
ization as a process of institutional change. 
Figure 1 indicates that different types of pri- 
vatization activities can be observed from link- 
ing the two dimensions of ownership rights and 
the appropriation of profits. In prior research 
scholars have failed to recognize the different 
types of privatization, thereby overlooking a ma- 
jor source of variation in the observed results of 
privatization. 
Four types of organizational forms are evident 
in Figure 1. Cell 1 represents the "pure public 
firm," where ownership rights are in the hands 
of public owners and the appropriation of profits 
is used for the public good. This type of organi- 
zation dominated many underdeveloped and so- 
cialist countries in the second half of the twen- 
tieth century. In cell 2 public owners control 
ownership (decision) rights while residual rents 
are appropriated through market (private) 
means. Here, two major organizational forms 
are prevalent: franchises and regulated firms. 
Both organizational forms have been used 
widely in developed and emerging economies. 
In cell 3 private owners hold ownership rights, 
but the appropriation of profits is performed for 
the public good. Such organizations typically 
are classified as "not-for-profit." Finally, in cell 4 
FIGURE 1 
Classification of Firms with Ownership Rights 
and Profit Orientation 
Ownership rights 
Private Public 
Pure private firm F Regulated 
0 9~~~~~~~~ Franchises 
.2 Yes 
0>4 (4) (2) 
U . Not-for-profit Pure public firm 
0 No organization 1. 
(3) (1) 
Source: Adapted from Salas (1998). 
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private owners to whom the profits are also dis- 
bursed hold the ownership rights. This cell, 
therefore, depicts the prototypical "pure private 
firm." 
We suggest that multiple outcomes are possi- 
ble when privatizing pure publicly owned firms 
(Figure 1). Most researchers readily recognize a 
firm's movement from pure public to pure pri- 
vate forms, but the other forms of organization 
require further study. For instance, the state 
might permit the private appropriation of resid- 
ual rents, thereby moving the firm from cell 1 to 
cell 2. Franchising and management contracts 
can be used to achieve this change. A final type 
of privatization entails moving the public firm 
(cell 1) to a not-for-profit status (cell 3). The state 
might make this change to avoid the costly man- 
agement of public firms while promoting effi- 
ciency and social good. Although theoretically 
interesting, management scholars have not sys- 
tematically examined this type of privatization 
strategy. 
As the above discussion suggests, privatiza- 
tion is a multidimensional construct that can 
affect different facets of organizational transfor- 
mation in multiple ways. Similarly, several 
forces can influence these dimensions, affecting 
the overall gains that companies are able to 
achieve following privatization. Understanding 
how to achieve these gains, however, requires 
an appreciation of the antecedents of privatiza- 
tion and the resulting changes from privatiza- 
tion. 
A MODEL OF PRIVATIZATION: ANTECEDENTS 
AND EFFECTS 
As shown in Figure 2, a complex set of vari- 
ables interacts to affect the mode and process of 
privatization (DeCastro & Uhlenbruck, 1997; 
Johnson & Loveman, 1995; Ogden & Watson, 
1999). These variables, however, differ signifi- 
cantly between developed and emerging econ- 
omies. Although in both types of economies gov- 
ernments aspire to curtail governmental control, 
promote competition, improve productivity, and 
induce market-based efficiency, in emerging 
economies other motives can significantly affect 
privatization efforts. Often, in emerging econo- 
mies, privatization has been implemented in re- 
sponse to demands from the International Mon- 
etary Fund (IMF). Governments of emerging 
economies that seek loans to support economic 
development often have been required to intro- 
duce substantial economic liberalization poli- 
cies (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, in press). 
Thus, in these economies privatization is used 
as a means of transplanting a procapitalist po- 
litical ideology by liberalizing the economy, pro- 
moting foreign investment, infusing new tech- 
nology, and increasing national standards of 
living. In some emerging economies privatiza- 
tion is also used as a means to upgrade infra- 
structure and facilitate future industrial growth. 
An improved infrastructure supports companies' 
efforts to enhance the efficiency of their opera- 
tions and also can facilitate the creation and 
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growth of new firms, which are the engine of 
economic and technological progress (Acs & Au- 
dretsch, 1993). 
Macroenvironmental factors alone do not ex- 
plain the selection of enterprises targeted for 
privatization. The importance of the enterprise 
to the national welfare or other sectors of the 
national economy plays a key role in the selec- 
tion process (Shafik, 1996). The economic impor- 
tance of an enterprise usually is determined by 
its potential contributions in fulfilling market 
demand, creating jobs, and meeting the needs of 
other sectors in the national economy. These 
evaluations, however, are also often based on 
the perceived importance of the enterprise for 
national sovereignty and identity. The greater 
the importance attached to national sover- 
eignty, the less likely it is that an enterprise will 
be privatized. 
Other factors that influence the selection of 
enterprises for privatization include their cost of 
operations, solvency, and track record in earn- 
ing profits (Shafik, 1996; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). 
For example, poorly performing public enter- 
prises frequently are among the first to be pri- 
vatized, perhaps to buffer the taxpayer from 
their operating costs. The decision to select an 
enterprise for privatization also depends on the 
availability of competent managerial leaders 
who can oversee the firm's transformation. This 
is a particularly difficult task in emerging econ- 
omies, where the lack of qualified senior exec- 
utives can make the transformation of a public 
enterprise into a private firm challenging (Oz- 
kaya & Askari, 1999). 
Most prior research on the antecedents of pri- 
vatization has been descriptive in nature or 
based on case studies (Johnson & Loveman, 
1995; Soulsby & Clark, 1996). Moreover, this re- 
search has not been well grounded in theory, 
making it difficult to draw solid conclusions 
about the relative importance of the different 
antecedent variables or to predict which firms 
are most likely to be privatized. Therefore, an 
important opportunity exists for management 
scholars to explore the determinants of privat- 
ization and their relative importance. It should 
be recognized that privatization decisions are 
not totally rational, because political factors af- 
fect the choice of companies to be privatized. 
Future research on privatization would also 
benefit from connecting the antecedent vari- 
ables discussed earlier (Figure 2) to the types of 
privatization strategies followed. 
PRIVATIZATION STRATEGIES: MODES AND 
PROCESSES 
Privatization can be partial or full, occurring 
in ways that include the sale of a company's 
assets or shares (through public bidding or ne- 
gotiated agreements) to domestic or foreign in- 
vestors; the granting of leases, concessions, or 
management contracts; and employee or man- 
agement buyouts (Djankov, 1999). Countries em- 
ploy different strategies in privatizing their 
economies (Cuervo & Villalonga, this issue) and 
use different strategies in separate economic 
sectors, or apply different strategies within the 
same sector at different points in time. These 
differences reflect variations in political ideol- 
ogy, stage of development, national cultures, 
and long-term development plans (Filatotchev, 
Wright, Buck, & Dymonia, 1999a; Filatotchev, 
Wright, Buck, & Zhukov, 1999b). 
Researchers have documented the frequency 
with which different modes of privatization have 
been used, as well as the resulting outcomes 
(success or the lack thereof; Djankov, 1999; 
D'Souza & Megginson, 1999; Welfens, 1992). Yet, 
as Cuervo and Villalonga (this issue) observe, 
little attention has been given to documenting 
the processes used to implement these strate- 
gies or to examining the relationship between 
them and subsequent changes in a company's 
structure or organizational culture. Still, there is 
anecdotal evidence that the process by which a 
firm is privatized could affect its future gains 
(Dean, Carlisle, & Baden-Fuller, 1999; Johnson & 
Loveman, 1995; Smith, Golden, & Pitcher, 1999). 
These observations are consistent with research 
indicating that the speed, direction, and magni- 
tude of changes introduced to revise a compa- 
ny's business definition, strategy, or organiza- 
tional structure can affect the outcomes of these 
efforts (Huber & Glick, 1995). As noted in Figure 
2, we separate these outcomes into first- and 
second-order effects. 
First-Order Effects of Privatization 
Privatization also creates a new context in 
which firms must compete to survive and suc- 
ceed. The transformation accompanying privat- 
ization changes the enterprise's structure and 
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the way it is managed, thereby leading to fun- 
damental changes in the firm's culture (Johnson 
& Loveman, 1995). Privatization also changes 
managers' incentives (Wright, Hoskisson, 
Busenitz, & Dial, this issue). Below we examine 
changes in managerial incentives, as well as 
organizational structure and culture following 
privatization. 
Managerial incentives. Managers of state- 
owned enterprises usually have limited discre- 
tion to initiate and implement strategic changes 
(Cragg & Dyck, 1999) and are constrained by 
bureaucratic controls that limit the scope of 
their activities and authority. Some of the con- 
trols are financial in nature, specifying perfor- 
mance quotas and targets. Financial controls 
typically reflect the objectives of political policy 
makers (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). Commonly, fi- 
nancial controls stifle managerial efforts to 
think strategically about the organization's pur- 
pose and the actions to be taken to achieve it 
(Hitt et al., in press c). Central or governmental 
planning authorities often have the responsibil- 
ity to establish public managers' compensation 
(Cragg & Dyck, 2000). 
Following privatization, a new set of dynam- 
ics occurs. Notably, senior managers begin to 
plan and develop strategies based on analyses 
of industry and market conditions. Managers 
also have the discretion to redefine organiza- 
tional goals to reflect the objectives of their key 
stakeholders (Yarrow, 1986). Furthermore, they 
have greater discretion in aligning resource al- 
locations with the firm's objectives. Discretion is 
the capability through which managers select 
and support projects that they believe are vital 
to accomplish the firnm's long-term goals. Re- 
source allocation decisions, therefore, should re- 
flect market realities and the managers' judg- 
ments about the strategic actions that have the 
highest probability of leading to firm profitabil- 
ity. Thus, after privatization, managerial discre- 
tion for resource allocation increases, improving 
the alignment among the firm's goals, re- 
sources, and capabilities. These observations 
are based on the assumption that managers are 
capable of operating effectively in a market 
economy and that they have the knowledge and 
skills required to develop and implement effec- 
tive strategies. 
After privatization, the firm and its manage- 
ment are subjected to market forces. The man- 
agers become accountable to shareholders, 
compelling them to pursue strategies that in- 
crease shareholder wealth. Managers assume 
the burden of reorganizing the existing capital 
and labor stocks, establishing sales and market- 
ing units, implementing new accounting and 
control systems, deciding new product strate- 
gies, and developing and implementing new in- 
vestment programs (Sachs & Lipton, 1990). As a 
result, managers' reputations and compensation 
should be tied to the firm's performance, provid- 
ing them with incentives to formulate and im- 
plement strategies that increase shareholder 
value (Zahra, 1996). There is evidence that man- 
agers' compensation increases following privat- 
ization and that the compensation of managers 
in privatized companies is similar to that of 
other publicly held corporations (Cragg & Dyck, 
2000). Increased discretion and compensation 
can improve managers' willingness to take risks 
and support innovation (Hoskisson, Hitt, & Hill, 
1993; Wright et al., this issue). 
Organizational structure and culture. The 
freeing of prices, reduction in regulation, and 
increase in competition associated with economic 
transition highlight the inefficient organization of 
firms before the privatization process. For firms to 
survive economic liberalization, they often need to 
be restructured. Limited research exists in which 
authors have examined the changes in a firm's 
organizational structure and culture following pri- 
vatization. The implications of these changes, if 
any, for managerial decision making have not 
been well documented (Cragg & Dyck, 1999, 2000). 
However, some research indicates that privatized 
companies often experience structural and cul- 
tural changes that affect their operations (Cuervo 
& Villalonga, this issue; Johnson & Loveman, 1995). 
For example, privatized firms become subject to 
market pressures and are forced to become more 
efficient and cost effective, which often requires 
employee attrition (D'Souza & Megginson, 1999). 
Privatized firms frequently downsize their em- 
ployee base and provide the survivors of such 
layoffs with training to develop new skills and 
increase job performance. Employee pay and ben- 
efits often are revised to reflect labor market con- 
ditions, and incentive systems and other ap- 
proaches are used to motivate employees and 
improve their performance. 
Privatized companies also change their organ- 
izational structures to ensure faster decision 
making by eliminating layers of management 
and reducing bureaucratic rules (Cuervo & Vil- 
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lalonga, this issue). Flatter organizational struc- 
tures, therefore, are more common in privatized 
companies, and they usually facilitate commu- 
nication between management and employees. 
Improved communication can strengthen em- 
ployee commitment to the organization, encour- 
aging employees to be more productive and in- 
novative. When the organizational culture 
strengthens employee identification with the 
company, it promotes a willingness to take the 
types of risk that lead to product, process, and 
administrative innovations (Kanter, 1989). 
Second-Order Effects of Privatization 
Privatization also creates a set of national 
(macro) and organizational (micro) changes, as 
indicated in Figure 2. These changes, in turn, 
may stimulate organizational learning (Doh, 
this issue; Newman, this issue) and the acquisi- 
tion of new skills. Learning capabilities and ad- 
ditional skills can provide the foundation for 
enhanced technological opportunities for firms, 
as well as the capabilities needed to gain ac- 
cess to different domestic and international net- 
works (Zahra et al., in press). We refer to these 
three variables (learning, opportunities, and 
networks) as second-order privatization effects. 
We distinguish these effects from the more ap- 
parent changes within a firm following privat- 
ization. 
Although more subtle than first-order effects, 
second-order effects are equally powerful in 
their potential impacts. Second-order privatiza- 
tion effects reflect the combined influences of 
internal (organizational) changes and external 
(macro) variables. Three potential second-order 
privatization effects are highlighted in Figure 2: 
improved organizational learning, increased 
technological opportunities, and gaining access 
to networks. 
Improved organizational learning. Ideally, the 
first-order effects discussed above (Figure 2) will 
create an internal environment that encourages 
managers to experiment and explore new stra- 
tegic alternatives. The changes privatization in- 
duces usually are so radical that a new organi- 
zational mindset is needed to comprehend and 
capitalize on the opportunities that become 
available to the firm (Smith et al., 1999). Thus, 
privatization can be viewed as a "frame- 
breaking" event that compels managers to envi- 
sion and examine their industry, environment, 
competition, and the firm from a different per- 
spective (Dean et al., 1999). Frame-breaking 
change usually is conducive to experimentation 
and innovation, which, in turn, promote organi- 
zational learning (Newman, this issue). 
Privatization also creates a business environ- 
ment hospitable to foreign investments, partic- 
ularly those involving the transfer of innovative 
technology, as well as modern management, 
production, and marketing techniques. Some 
foreign investors partner with privatized compa- 
nies by forming strategic alliances, such as joint 
ventures. These alliances give the privatized 
companies opportunities to learn new skills and 
capabilities from their more resource-rich for- 
eign partners (often from developed market 
countries; Hitt et al., in press a). 
Learning new capabilities is likely to facili- 
tate privatized companies' abilities to capitalize 
on market opportunities. The freedom to act in- 
dependently because of privatization also spurs 
innovation that increases technological oppor- 
tunities throughout an entire industry. As such, 
privatized firms can introduce new products and 
services to the market, unencumbered by gov- 
ernment bureaucracy or political processes. Al- 
ternatively, privatized firms may initially attempt 
to license, copy, or imitate the technological skills 
of their advanced foreign partners or rivals. 
These imitative processes are important, es- 
pecially in the developmental stage, where pri- 
vatized firms focus on building their skills and 
capabilities by learning from foreign partners or 
competitors. Appropriation by imitation is af- 
fected by the degree to which partners protect 
their proprietary technologies through formal 
mechanisms (e.g., contracts) or informal means 
(e.g., structural configurations influencing the 
nature of interactions between partners). Once 
they achieve technological proficiency, how- 
ever, some privatized firms experiment with 
new R&D processes to develop innovations. Ex- 
perimentation also enables privatized firms to 
develop a new set of routines that can be useful 
in making the transition from imitation to inno- 
vation (Kim, 1997). 
Increased technological opportunities. We de- 
fine technological opportunities as the potential 
for product and process innovation within an 
industry. As indicated in Figure 2, we expect 
these opportunities to increase subsequent to 
privatization. Privatization often encourages for- 
eign investments (Filatotchev et al., 1999a) that 
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facilitate or even promote technology transfer. 
Foreign partners may be willing to transfer the 
technology because of a potentially significant 
return on their investment over time. Also, for- 
eign partners may learn new capabilities from 
the venture (Hitt et al., in press a; Zahra et al., in 
press). The flow of modern technology into a 
newly privatized economy can spark innovation 
as local entrepreneurs use this technology to 
pursue promising market opportunities. The 
transfer of technology also allows local entre- 
preneurs to integrate separate technologies im- 
ported from different countries. This process fu- 
els experimentation and innovation, leading to 
higher productivity. 
Following privatization, technological oppor- 
tunities are likely to increase, because local en- 
trepreneurs are more willing to take risks, either 
by forming their own companies or by forming 
joint ventures. This process is made easier by 
informal and formal sources of venture capital 
that increase following the liberalization of an 
economy, encouraging entrepreneurs to identify 
and pursue new market opportunities. Also, de- 
velopmental financial institutions (DFIs) often 
play an important role in financing privatized 
companies' strategic actions or entrepreneurial 
efforts. George and Prabhu (this issue) describe 
DFIs and their roles in emerging economies. 
DFIs' role is similar to that of large institutional 
investors present in developed countries. These 
organizations provide long-term capital through 
loans or take equity positions in newly privat- 
ized firms. Some DFIs offer a range of other 
important services in addition to providing cap- 
ital, such as serving in a consulting-type capac- 
ity. In this capacity DFIs assist in efforts to iden- 
tify market opportunities, search for managerial 
talent, and conduct feasibility studies. These 
services and growing access to capital can in- 
crease the competitiveness of privatized firms 
(George & Prabhu, this issue). 
The identification arnd pursuit of new techno- 
logical opportunities vary across countries and 
economies. The speed of actions taken to iden- 
tify and pursue these opportunities depends 
partially on the national economy's level of 
technological sophistication, as well as its ab- 
sorptive capacity (ability to learn). A country's 
absorptive capacity is, determined by its prior 
investments to acquire and assimilate techno- 
logical skills (Mowery & Oxley, 1995). As the 
absorptive capacity of the country expands, its 
ability to assimilate new technology increases. 
Assimilation increases the ease and speed of 
innovation diffusion, thereby igniting innova- 
tion. Given the interdependence of economic 
sectors, innovation in one industry can fuel in- 
novation in other industries, thereby enhancing 
the total set of technological opportunities. 
National culture is another factor that can de- 
termine the nature and size of emerging techno- 
logical opportunities. Some research indicates 
that national cultural variables play a major 
role in determining the rates of innovation 
(Shane, 1995). In societies valuing risk taking 
and innovation, entrepreneurs are likely to seek 
and identify market opportunities that might 
have been overlooked prior to the liberalization 
of the economy. Further, coupled with the adop- 
tion of imported technologies, the effect of na- 
tional cultures in these societies on creating 
technological opportunities will increase fol- 
lowing privatization. These opportunities will 
expand as domestic entrepreneurs become con- 
nected to influential networks within and across 
their national borders. 
Gaining access to networks. Liberalization of 
an economy and extensive privatization are also 
expected to link domestic producers and entre- 
preneurs to venture capitalists, investors, and 
technology providers outside their national bor- 
ders. As stated previously, privatization often 
encourages foreign investments in the form of 
cooperative ventures and the increased avail- 
ability of institutional capital. Following privat- 
ization, foreign investors become an important 
linkage between local firms and external 
sources of ideas, technology, and capital. Matur- 
ing relationships between domestic firms and 
foreign investors also build trust, thereby allow- 
ing a free flow of information and ideas leading 
to additional ventures. Of course, the develop- 
ment of trust and the learning that can occur as 
a result of its emergence can lead to additional 
cooperative ventures and enhanced innovation. 
Domestic firms might develop their own trade 
associations or cooperative organizations to in- 
crease their chances of survival. As in devel- 
oped countries, trade associations and other or- 
ganizations that are framed around mutual 
interests disseminate information. The purpose 
of this information is to educate members re- 
garding current market opportunities and possi- 
bilities, as well as the nature of different com- 
petitive strategies, and to provide the insights 
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required to lobby local and state officials. Effec- 
tive lobbying efforts are those through which firm 
representatives articulate common industry posi- 
tions about issues of critical interest to trade as- 
sociation members. Cooperative associations also 
serve as a catalyst for further new venture part- 
nerships among members (Doh, this issue). 
ENTREPRENEURIAL OUTCOMES OF 
PRIVATIZATION 
Our model highlights two key entrepreneurial 
outcomes of privatization: innovation and new 
ventures (or venturing; Figure 2). We refer to 
innovation as the creation of goods and ser- 
vices, where product innovation also includes 
upgrades and extensions of existing products 
(incremental innovation). It also includes radi- 
cal new product development. Whether radi- 
cally new or modified products, these innova- 
tions are necessary to capitalize on the 
technological opportunities created by liberal- 
ization of the economy and the resulting privat- 
ization. Product innovations help to meet the 
growing expectations of consumers who have dis- 
cretionary incomes created through risk taking in 
the new economy. Process innovations or the in- 
troduction of new methods of producing goods or 
services also should flourish following privatiza- 
tion. Process innovations are necessary to assim- 
ilate foreign technologies in domestic industries 
and to build new and efficient manufacturing sys- 
tems. Thus, process innovations contribute to the 
operational efficiencies and improved productiv- 
ity levels often reported following privatization. 
New ventures involving the creation of new 
business or a move into new domestic and inter- 
national markets are perhaps the most visible 
changes following privatization. Favorable tax 
laws rewarding calculated risk-taking practices 
can encourage new business creation. Changes in 
property laws also accompany privatization, mak- 
ing it safer for individuals or groups of investors to 
create, own, and manage a new enterprise. 
Domestic and international venturing are im- 
portant means for developing new revenue 
sources (Zahra, 1996). Venturing is made possi- 
ble by the emergence of supportive industries 
and services (e.g., international consultants), in- 
creased exposure to different economic systems, 
and access to networks. Domestic companies 
also join forces with international firms to pen- 
etrate new domestic and international markets. 
Figure 2 indicates that the macro and micro 
changes discussed can directly influence privat- 
ization outcomes. In prior research scholars 
have linked changes in a firm's institutional 
context to increased innovation and venturing 
(Kirzner, 1973; Morris, 1998). Macroinstitutional 
changes are crucial in inducing strategic 
changes (Newman, this issue). 
CAVEATS AND EXTENSIONS OF MODEL 
The above discussion suggests that privatiza- 
tion can yield diverse but important outcomes 
that create wealth for nations and companies. 
Nonetheless, articles in this issue also indicate 
that the lack of institutional infrastructure might 
serve as a barrier to successful entrepreneurial 
efforts (see Newman and Spicer, McDermott, & 
Kogut, this issue). 
Newman explains that although institutional 
change is necessary to promote the organiza- 
tional changes desired, too much institutional 
change can inhibit second-order learning. When 
this occurs, some managers rely on obsolete or 
older inappropriate routines that lead to non- 
adaptive mimetic changes (Newman & Nollen, 
1998). This type of institutional "upheaval," as 
Newman (this issue) calls it, has especially 
strong effects on firms that were embedded in 
the central planning systems in the former so- 
cialist countries. These firms did not possess 
sufficient entrepreneurial capabilities and are 
unable to operate effectively in a market- 
oriented economy without significant support. 
Equally important, Johnson and colleagues 
(this issue) argue that public sector managers 
develop a mindset, through institutionalization 
processes, that is counterproductive with re- 
spect to effective privatization. These authors 
observe that privatization requires a shift from 
one institutional template to another. For these 
reasons and others, Spicer and colleagues (this 
issue) argue that entrepreneurship is better fos- 
tered through gradual privatization processes 
(as completed through negotiated property 
rights reform processes) rather than large-scale 
rapid privatizations. The gradual approach per- 
mits experimentation with infrastructure needs 
and institutions to determine the ones that are 
more effective as compared to an immediate 
change to a total market-based economy. 
In addition to institutional barriers, privatized 
firms in emerging economies might experience 
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unique agency costs. In these countries the cor- 
porate governance structures and laws govern- 
ing ownership rights often are underdeveloped 
and/or weak (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 
this issue). The weak governance structures and 
limited protection of minority shareholders often 
create the potential for significant agency prob- 
lems. Managers in newly privatized firms might 
expropriate the firm's assets, grant themselves 
special privileges, and become entrenched, op- 
posing change and innovation. Of course, these 
outcomes are antithetical to those expected from 
privatization, as described earlier. Dharwadkar 
and colleagues, therefore, suggest that stronger 
governance structures and protection of owner- 
ship rights are required to overcome the agency 
problems some privatized firms experience. 
These authors also propose that certain owner- 
ship, organizational, and capital structures are 
likely to be more effective in the emerging econ- 
omy context. These structures can mitigate 
agency costs and improve firm performance. 
Interestingly, firms in which DFIs are in- 
volved, by providing capital, are likely to have 
stronger governance mechanisms. In fact, 
George and Prabhu (this issue) argue that DFI 
involvement in firm governance increases value 
creation. DFIs usually encourage efficient re- 
source utilization and act to prevent agency 
problems. However, DFIs might not become in- 
volved in the governance of a firm unless it is 
vital to the national economic interest or priori- 
ties. Thus, DFIs may help prevent or resolve 
some but not all of the potential agency prob- 
lems in newly privatized firms. 
Wright and colleagues (this issue) suggest 
that the agency problems can be mitigated with 
the right incentive structure. Specifically, a com- 
bination of appropriate ownership, organization- 
al, and incentive structures, along with institu- 
tional investor involvement, can reduce the 
agency problems and increase the effectiveness 
of privatization. Outcomes such as these may 
become part of the negotiated processes that 
Spicer and colleagues (this issue) discuss. 
Doh (this issue) argues that privatization 
takes many forms, as suggested earlier. More 
important, Doh emphasizes the benefits a firm 
gains by being a first mover in privatization. 
Interestingly, he says that the benefits of the 
first mover are greater when it partners with an 
incumbent. Second and third movers, Doh ar- 
gues, are at a significant disadvantage in this 
environment. Clearly, this is an empirical ques- 
tion. Indeed, Ramamurti (this issue) suggests 
that the causes of privatization and their effects 
are understood properly only through a dynam- 
ic-not a static-model: one that encompasses 
analyses of firm, industry, and country effects. 
These works, coupled with all the issues ad- 
dressed in the special topic forum, suggest sev- 
eral areas for future research. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
The articles in this special topic forum provide 
a wealth of issues for scholars to examine as 
they conduct future studies on privatization. Ta- 
ble 1 summarizes the focus, level of analysis, 
economic context, theoretical basis, and vari- 
ables examined in each of the contributions in- 
cluded in the special topic forum. The theoreti- 
cal arguments the contributors articulate, as 
well as the propositions they offer, should be 
tested empirically. 
Further, we suggest below other avenues for 
additional research. The area of privatization 
and entrepreneurial transformation is particu- 
larly rich in research opportunities. The increas- 
ing globalization of the world economy high- 
lights the need for a greater appreciation and 
understanding of the effects of privatization on 
entrepreneurial transformation. 
Several areas require further research. First, 
the effects of different types and levels of privat- 
ization should be explored. We believe that all 
privatization activities are unlikely to have the 
same outcomes; as such, more work must be 
done to identify the specific effects of each type 
and level of privatization to have a better theo- 
retical understanding of the outcomes expected 
from privatization. Ramamurti's (this issue) sug- 
gestion of the difference between broad and 
narrow privatizations may be a framework 
through which some of these research questions 
could be explored. 
Second, the increasing growth of cooperative 
arrangements (e.g., strategic alliances) among 
firms is another issue requiring study. Do alli- 
ances facilitate privatized firms' efforts to com- 
pete successfully in market-based economies? 
Are the most successful partnerships formed be- 
tween newly privatized firms within the same 
economy or between a newly privatized firm 
and another company from a developed econ- 
omy? 
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TABLE 1 
Articles in This Issue: Themes and Theoretical Bases 
Economic Level of 
Author(s) Context Analysis Theory Base Ownership Structure Dependent Variables 
Ramamurti Emerging Multiple Agency theory * Partial ownership Selection of firms to be 
economies * Dispersed ownership privatized 
* Employee stock ownership 
plans 
* Local groups 
* Multinational enterprises 
Doh Emerging Firm Integration of I/O Not applicable First mover advantage and 
economies and resource- entrepreneurial 
based view transformation 
Johnson, Smith, & Emerging Manager Microinstitutional Not applicable Entrepreneurial mindset 
Codling economies and firm perspective 
Cuervo & Villalonga Emerging and Firm Agency theory Not applicable Company performance 
advanced and public choice 
economies theory 
Wright, Hoskisson, Transition Firm Agency and Management ownership Managerial behavior and 
Busenitz, & Dial economies cognition theory (through buyouts) entrepreneurial activities 
Newman Transition Firm Organizational Not applicable Organizational 
economies learning, transformation, learning, and 
institutional theory, entrepreneurial behavior 
and organizational 
change theory 
George & Prabhu Emerging Country Stakeholder theory * Management and Firm performance 
economies and firm and corporate employee 
governance * Foreign firms 
* Domestic individuals and 
firms 
Spicer, McDermott, Emerging Firm Institutional Not applicable Effective policies, focused on 
& Kogut economies theory gradual restructuring, that 
foster entrepreneurship 
Dharwadkar, George, Emerging Firm Agency theory * Ownership dispersion Managerial behavior and 
& Brandes economies (dominant vs. distributed) firm performance 
* Ownership type (outsider 
vs. insider) 
As Table 1 indicates, the authors of articles 
published in this special topic forum have used 
several theoretical bases, including industrial 
organization (I/O) economics, the resource- 
based view of the firm, and institutional theory, 
to describe newly privatized firms' behavior. Or- 
ganizational learning and organizational 
change theories also have been applied to help 
us understand how newly privatized firms react 
to their changing environments. Finally, authors 
have analyzed agency theory and entrepreneur- 
ial cognition theory to explain managerial be- 
havior. Still, we need to understand how these 
theoretical perspectives can be integrated to de- 
velop a theory of privatized firm behavior. 
Which of these theoretical perspectives provide 
the most effective explanations of privatized 
firms and managerial behavior? Are there other 
potent theories that can help in understanding 
these important phenomena? 
Beyond these points and theoretical issues is 
a specific set of research questions we believe 
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scholars should address in future research. For 
example, research should be completed that 
will contribute to our understanding of how the 
institutional infrastructure affects the entrepre- 
neurial potential of privatization. What steps 
can be taken to change the infrastructure simul- 
taneously with privatization? How can privat- 
ization be successfully implemented? 
Johnson and colleagues (this issue) argue that 
an entrepreneurial mindset is not common 
among managers in privatized firms, although 
this mindset likely is related positively to strong 
performance following privatization. We need 
more research on how to infuse an entrepreneur- 
ial mindset in managers within newly privat- 
ized firms. Moreover, what is the relationship 
between a global mindset (Hitt et al., 2001b) and 
an entrepreneurial one? Is a combination of the 
two mindsets one that would be even more fa- 
cilitative of firm success while privatizing and 
following the completion of the privatization 
process? Perhaps managerial incentives are the 
answer, as suggested by Wright and colleagues 
(this issue), in that appropriate incentives might 
stimulate and support development of appropri- 
ate entrepreneurial mindsets. 
We need empirical work, however, in which 
scholars examine this issue. Do the incentives 
reduce the agency problems identified by Dhar- 
wadkar and colleagues (this issue)? If not, why 
not, and what incentives might overcome 
agency problems? Can DFIs facilitate the forma- 
tion of entrepreneurial mindsets by providing 
more effective governance of privatized firms? 
Are there better means of establishing effective 
governance in privatized firms? If so, do these 
means vary by the characteristics of unique na- 
tional cultures? 
Peng (in press) argues that changes in transi- 
tional economies to a free market system un- 
leash the power of entrepreneurship. His argu- 
ments relate to general entrepreneurial ventures 
developed in the economy, as opposed to privat- 
ized firms. For example, Peng suggests that in 
Central and Eastern Europe, about 5 percent of the 
adult population has started a new venture-a 
figure similar to the percent of the population in 
the United States engaging in entrepreneurial 
ventures. McCarthy, Puffer, and Shekshnia (1993) 
also describe the resurgence of an entrepreneurial 
class in Russia. Therefore, while privatized firms 
may experience problems operating entrepre- 
neurially in a free market, entrepreneurial ven- 
tures may flourish in the general population. 
Clearly, we need additional research to under- 
stand how the entrepreneurial mindset develops 
in the general population, as well as insights 
about why this mindset permits some to identify 
and exploit opportunities while others fail to do so 
(Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Moreover, addi- 
tional research should be conducted to isolate the 
outcomes of entrepreneurial ventures outside of 
privatized firms in transition economies. 
There is a need to understand human resource 
management (HRM) requirements in newly pri- 
vatized firms, especially in transition econo- 
mies. How can employees' skills, motivation, 
and productivity be enhanced? What are the 
most effective ways in which explicit and tacit 
knowledge can be developed and transferred 
among the workforces of former state-owned en- 
terprises? According to Welsh, Luthans, and 
Sommer (1993), the HRM challenges might be 
particularly significant in these firms. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Privatization is a frequently used strategic op- 
tion in today's rapidly globalizing economy. 
Driving the popularity of this strategy is the 
desire of different nations' governments to spur 
the type of economic activity that will allow 
their countries to be productive participants in 
global markets-markets that, in many in- 
stances, are becoming more consistent with the 
forces of free market economies in their opera- 
tional and legislative contexts. The popularity of 
privatization is evident in developing and de- 
veloped, as well as emerging, markets. In devel- 
oped markets, formerly state-controlled indus- 
tries are being deregulated (e.g., utilities). Thus, 
privatization occurs in selected sectors, and be- 
cause of an active free market in other sectors, 
there are many successful examples (best prac- 
tices) of the newly deregulated firms to follow. 
In emerging economies, however, it is com- 
mon for many industries to be operated or con- 
trolled by the national or state governments. 
Furthermore, privatization might be required by 
external parties for the financing needed (e.g., 
IMF), encouraging these governments to liberal- 
ize their economies. In these cases there is 
mass, and oftentimes rapid, privatization. Mass 
privatization is intended to support a rapid pri- 
vatization program, in which the state's role is 
minimized and the market's role maximized 
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(Spicer et al., this issue). The twin goals of mass 
privatization often may be speed and fairness 
(Newman & Nollen, 1998). Nonetheless, because 
infrastructures required to privatize enterprises 
in a "fair" manner might not be developed 
quickly during a mass privatization program or 
process, the fairness dimension in countries ex- 
periencing a rapid privatization process often 
becomes a subject of debate among citizens and 
their government representatives. 
As this discussion and some of the articles 
included in the special topic forum indicate, 
there are few previous exemplars or models of 
privatization in the global economy. The privat- 
ized firms in developed markets frequently are 
resource rich, whereas those in emerging mar- 
kets are resource poor. The emerging market 
context is more uncertain, with economic, social, 
and political instability (Hitt et al., in press a). 
These characteristics of the environment clearly 
affect the rules of exchange in markets (North, 
1990). There are major differences in the institu- 
tional infrastructures between emerging and de- 
veloped economy countries (Newman, this issue). 
Thus, the entrepreneurial outcomes are not as cer- 
tain as suggested in the previous literature on the 
economic transformation in transition economies. 
The work published in this special topic forum 
provides some explanations and describes activ- 
ities that might be necessary to promote more 
effective entrepreneurial efforts. The articles pre- 
sented herein also offer an interesting set of an- 
swers to existing but complex questions, along 
with new research questions. 
We are pleased to commend the authors' con- 
tributions to you. We hope these articles will 
stimulate interesting and productive analyses 
of important research questions about privatiza- 
tion and entrepreneurial transformations across 
multiple types of economic structures. 
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